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Abstract
Barriers to international trade are known to be large but due to data limitations it is
hard to measure them directly for a large number of countries over many years. To
address this problem I derive a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade costs that
indirectly infers trade frictions from observable trade data. I show that this trade
cost measure is consistent with a broad range of leading trade theories including
Ricardian and heterogeneous rms models. The measure implies that U.S. trade
costs with major trading partners declined on average by about 40 percent between
1970 and 2000, with Mexico and Canada experiencing the biggest reductions.
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1 Introduction
International trade has grown enormously over the last few decades, and almost every country
trades considerably more today than thirty or forty years ago. One reason for this increase in
trade has undoubtedly been the decline in international trade costs, for example the decline
in transportation costs and tari¤s. But which countries have experienced the fastest declines
in trade costs, and how big are the remaining barriers? These questions are important for
understanding what impedes globalization, yet we know surprisingly little about the barriers
that prevent international market integration.
This paper sheds light on these issues by developing a way of measuring the barriers to
international trade. Specically, I derive a micro-founded measure of aggregate bilateral trade
costs that I obtain from the gravity equation. As a workhorse model of international trade, the
gravity equation relates bilateral trade to countrieseconomic size and bilateral trade costs. It
has been used for many decades to explain the extent of bilateral trade ows, and it has one of
the strongest empirical track records in economics. The core idea of the paper is to analytically
solve a theoretical gravity equation for the trade cost parameters that capture the barriers to
international trade. The resulting solution expresses the trade cost parameters as a function of
observable trade data and thus provides a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade costs that
can be tracked over time. The measure is useful in practice because it is easy to implement
empirically with readily available data.
The advantage of this trade cost measure is that it captures a wide range of trade cost
components. These include transportation costs and tari¤s but also other components that
can be di¢ cult to observe such as language barriers, informational costs and bureaucratic red
tape.1 While it would be desirable to collect direct data on individual trade cost components
at di¤erent points in time and add them up to obtain a summary measure of trade costs, this is
hardly possible in practice due to severe data limitations. The trade cost measure derived in this
paper avoids this problem by providing researchers with a gauge of comprehensive international
trade costs that is easy to construct. It can be helpful not only for studying international
trade but also for other applications that require a time-varying measure of bilateral market
integration.
The approach taken in this paper has a strong theoretical foundation. I show that inferring
trade costs indirectly from trade data is consistent with a large variety of leading international
trade models. Specically, I derive the trade cost measure from the well-known gravity model by
Anderson and vanWincoop (2003), the Ricardian model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) as well as
the heterogeneous rms models by Chaney (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Although
these models make fundamentally di¤erent assumptions about the driving forces behind inter-
national trade, they have in common that they yield gravity equations in general equilibrium.2
I exploit this similarity and demonstrate that all these models lead to an isomorphic trade cost
1For example, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) highlight hidden transaction costs due to poor security.
Portes and Rey (2005) identify costs of international information transmission.
2On the generality of the gravity equation also see Grossman (1998), Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001),
Evenett and Keller (2002) and Feenstra (2004). Since the trade cost measure is derived from the gravity
equation, it can be interpreted as a gravity residualthat compares actual trade ows to those predicted by
the gravity equation for a hypothetical frictionless world. In that sense its nature is related to the literature on
missing trade that juxtaposes actual and predicted trade ows (see Treer, 1995).
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measure. The intuition is that gravity equations are basic expenditure equations that indicate
how consumers allocate spending across countries under the constraints of trade barriers. The
motivation for purchasing foreign goods could be that they are either inherently di¤erent from
domestic goods as in an Armington world, or they are produced relatively more e¢ ciently as in
a Ricardian world. I show formally that for the purpose of measuring international trade costs,
it does not matter why consumers choose to spend money on foreign goods.
As an illustration, I take the trade cost measure to the data and compute U.S. bilateral
trade costs for a number of major trading partners. First, I nd that the level of trade costs in
the year 2000, expressed as a tari¤ equivalent, is lowest for Canada at 25 percent, followed by
Mexico at 33 percent. But trade costs are considerably higher for Japan and the UK at over 60
percent. While these levels are consistent with comprehensive ballpark gures in the literature,
for example those reported by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), they have the advantage
of being country-pair specic. Second, I nd that over the period 1970-2000, U.S. trade costs
declined by about 40 percent on average, consistent with improvements in transportation and
communication technology. But coinciding with the formation of NAFTA, the decline in trade
costs was considerably steeper for Canada and Mexico.
There are two di¤erences between the trade cost measure derived in this paper and tradi-
tional gravity estimation. First, as I infer aggregate trade costs indirectly from observable trade
data, there is no need to assume any particular trade cost function. In contrast, every estimated
gravity regression implicitly assumes such a function by relying on trade cost proxies such as
geographical distance as explanatory variables. A potential problem with that approach is that
many trade cost components such as non-tari¤ barriers might be omitted because it is hard
to nd empirical proxies for them. The trade cost measure in this paper avoids this problem
because it captures a comprehensive set of trade barriers. As a result, the trade cost levels
reported above exceed the numbers associated with individual components such as freight rates
because those only represent a subset of overall trade costs. The second di¤erence is that many
typical trade cost proxies such as distance do not vary over time. A static trade cost function
is therefore ill-suited to capture the variation of trade costs over time.3 However, the mea-
sure derived in this paper is a function of time-varying observable trade data and thus allows
researchers to trace changes in bilateral trade costs over time.
Finally, I use the gravity framework to examine the driving forces behind the strong growth
of international trade over the last decades. I decompose the growth of bilateral trade into
three distinct contributions the growth of income, the decline of bilateral trade barriers and
the decline of multilateral barriers, or multilateral resistance as coined by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003). I nd that income growth explains the majority of U.S. trade growth over
the period 1970-2000. The decline of bilateral trade barriers is the second biggest contribution
but this contribution varies considerably across trading partners. For example, the decline of
bilateral trade barriers is about twice as important for explaining the growth of trade with
Mexico as it is for explaining the growth of trade with Japan. My results are consistent with
those of Baier and Bergstrand (2001) who argue that two-thirds of the growth in trade amongst
OECD countries between 1958 and 1988 can be explained by the growth of income. But the
innovation of my decomposition is to explicitly account for the role of multilateral resistance. As
3For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) only consider trade costs in cross-sectional data for the
year 1993.
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I obtain an analytical solution for the unobservable multilateral resistance variables, I can relate
them to observable trade data. Previously it has been either impossible or very cumbersome
to solve for multilateral resistance.
An alternative approach to measuring trade costs in the literature is to consider price di¤er-
ences across borders. This is motivated by the idea that arbitrage will eliminate price di¤erences
in the absence of international trade costs. While this approach is in principle promising, it is
plagued by the di¢ culty of getting reliable price data on comparable goods in di¤erent countries.
Another approach attempts to measure trade costs directly (see Anderson and van Wincoop,
2004, for a survey). Limão and Venables (2001) employ data on the cost of shipping a stan-
dard 40-foot container from Baltimore, Maryland, to various destinations in the world, showing
that transport costs are signicantly increased by poor infrastructure and adverse geographic
features such as being landlocked. Hummels (2007) examines the costs of ocean shipping and
air transportation. Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) propose a trade restrictiveness index that
is based on observable tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers. They show that tari¤s alone are a poor
indicator of trade restrictiveness since non-tari¤ barriers also provide a considerable degree of
trade protection. I view such direct measures as complements to indirect measures that are
inferred from trade ows. Direct measures have the advantage of being more precise on the
particular trade cost components that they capture. But the direct approach is often restricted
by data limitations and by the fact that many trade cost components are unobservable.
The gravity framework by Anderson and vanWincoop (2003) has attracted a lot of attention
in the literature. Baier and Bergstrand (2009) show that in gravity applications the nonlin-
ear multilateral resistance terms can be approximated by a log-linear Taylor-series expansion.
Instead of an approximation my approach yields an analytical solution for the multilateral re-
sistance terms that is easy to implement. Furthermore, Balistreri and Hillberry (2007) argue
that Anderson and van Wincoops (2003) solution of the border puzzle critically hinges on the
assumption of bilateral trade cost symmetry. In contrast, I do not constrain bilateral trade costs
to be symmetric and instead focus on the average of bilateral trade barriers in both directions.
This approach accommodates underlying trade cost asymmetries.
Although I derive the trade cost measure from a wide range of leading trade models, the
derivation that is based on the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) framework is related to the
freeness of trademeasure in the New Economic Geography literature. The freeness measure
captures the inverse of trade costs so that a high value corresponds to low trade barriers (see
Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999; Head and Ries, 2001; Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano
and Robert-Nicoud, 2003; Head and Mayer, 2004). My paper adds to this literature by pointing
out the direct link to the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) gravity framework and by relating
unobservable multilateral resistance variables to observable data. In addition, it provides the
more general insight that the trade cost measure can be derived from model classes that are
not typically considered in that literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I derive the micro-founded trade cost
measure, showing that it is consistent with a wide range of leading trade models. In Section
3, I present U.S. bilateral trade costs for a number of major trading partners. In Section 4,
I decompose the growth of bilateral trade into the growth of income and the decline of trade
barriers. Section 5 provides a discussion of the results and a number of robustness checks.
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Trade Costs in General Equilibrium
In this section, I derive the micro-founded measure of bilateral trade costs. I base the derivation
on the well-known Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model. This is one of the most parsimo-
nious trade models, which makes the derivation particularly intuitive. But in fact, the trade
cost measure does not hinge on that particular model. To demonstrate that it is valid more
generally I also show how the trade cost measure can be derived from two di¤erent types of
trade models the Ricardian model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) as well as the heterogeneous
rms models by Chaney (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
2.1 Trade Costs in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) develop a multi-country general equilibrium model of inter-
national trade. Each country is endowed with a single good that is di¤erentiated from those
produced by other countries. Optimizing individual consumers enjoy consuming a large variety
of domestic and foreign goods. Their preferences are assumed to be identical across countries
and are captured by constant elasticity of substitution utility.
As the key element in their model, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) introduce exogenous
bilateral trade costs. When a good is shipped from country i to j, bilateral variable transporta-
tion costs and other variable trade barriers drive up the cost of each unit shipped. As a result
of trade costs, goods prices di¤er across countries. Specically, if pi is the net supply price of
the good originating in country i, then pij = pitij is the price of this good faced by consumers in
country j, where tij  1 is the gross bilateral trade cost factor (one plus the tari¤ equivalent).4
Based on this framework Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive a micro-founded gravity
equation with trade costs:
xij =
yiyj
yW

tij
iPj
1 
(1)
xij denotes nominal exports from i to j, yi is nominal income of country i and yW is world
income dened as yW Pj yj.  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods. i and Pj
are country is and country js price indices.
The gravity equation implies that all else being equal, bigger countries trade more with
each other. Bilateral trade costs tij decrease bilateral trade but they have to be measured
against the price indices i and Pj. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) call these price indices
multilateral resistance variables because they include trade costs with all other partners and
can be interpreted as average trade costs. Their exact expressions are given by
1 i =
X
j
P  1j jt
1 
ij 8i (2)
P 1 j =
X
i
 1i it
1 
ij 8j (3)
where j is the world income share of country j dened as j  yj=yW . i is the outward
4Modeling trade costs in this way is consistent with the iceberg formulation that portrays trade costs as if
an iceberg were shipped across the ocean and partly melted in transit (e.g., Samuelson, 1954, and Krugman,
1980).
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multilateral resistance variable as it includes bilateral trade costs tij summed over and weighted
by all destination countries j, whereas Pj is the inward multilateral resistance variable as it
includes bilateral trade costs tij summed over and weighted by all origin countries i. Thus, an
important insight from gravity equation (1) is that bilateral trade ows depend not only on the
bilateral trade barrier but also on the multilateral trade barriers of the two countries involved.
2.1.1 The Link between Multilateral Resistance and Intranational Trade
Since direct measures for appropriately averaged trade costs are generally not available, it is
di¢ cult to nd expressions for the multilateral resistance variables in equations (2) and (3).
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) assume that bilateral trade costs are a function of two
particular trade cost proxies a border barrier and geographical distance. In particular, they
assume the trade cost function tij = bijd

ij where bij is a border-related indicator variable,
dij is bilateral distance and  is the distance elasticity. In addition, they simplify the model
by assuming that bilateral trade costs are symmetric (i.e., tij = tji). Under the symmetry
assumption it follows that outward and inward multilateral resistance are the same (i.e., i =
Pi). Thus, conditioning on these additional assumptions, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
nd an implicit solution for multilateral resistance based on (2) and (3).
There are a number of drawbacks associated with the additional assumptions.5 First, the
chosen trade cost function might be misspecied. Its functional form might be incorrect and
it might omit important trade cost determinants such as tari¤s. Second, bilateral trade costs
might be asymmetric, for example if one country imposes higher tari¤s than the other. Third,
in practice trade barriers are time-varying, for example when countries phase out tari¤s. Time-
invariant trade cost proxies such as distance are therefore hardly useful in capturing trade cost
changes over time.6
In what follows, I propose a method that helps to overcome these drawbacks by deriving
an analytical solution for multilateral resistance variables. This method does not rely on any
particular trade cost function and it does not impose trade cost symmetry. Instead, trade costs
are inferred from time-varying trade data that are readily observable.
Intuitively, my method makes use of the insight that a change in bilateral trade barriers
does not only a¤ect international trade but also intranational trade. For example, suppose
that country is trade barriers with all other countries fall. In that case, some of the goods
that country i used to consume domestically, i.e., intranationally, are now shipped to foreign
countries. It is therefore not only the extent of international trade that depends on trade
barriers with the rest of the world but also the extent of intranational trade.
This can be seen formally by using gravity equation (1) to nd an expression for country
is intranational trade
xii =
yiyi
yW

tii
iPi
1 
(4)
where tii represents intranational trade costs, for example domestic transportation costs. Equa-
5Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, p. 180) provide a brief discussion on this point.
6Combes and Lafourcade (2005) show that although distance is a good proxy for transport costs in cross-
sectional data, it is of very limited use for time series data.
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tion (4) can be solved for the product of outward and inward multilateral resistance as
iPi =

xii=yi
yi=yW
 1
( 1)
tii (5)
As an example suppose two countries i and j face the same domestic trade costs tii = tjj and
are of the same size yi = yj but country i is a more closed economy, that is, xii > xjj. It follows
directly from (5) that multilateral resistance is higher for country i (iPi > jPj). Equation
(5) implies that for given tii it is easy to measure the change in multilateral resistance over time
as it does not depend on time-invariant trade cost proxies such as distance.
2.1.2 A Micro-Founded Measure of Trade Costs
The explicit solution for the multilateral resistance variables can be exploited to solve the model
for bilateral trade costs. Gravity equation (1) contains the product of outward multilateral
resistance of one country and inward multilateral resistance of another country, iPj, whereas
equation (5) provides a solution for iPi. It is therefore useful to multiply gravity equation (1)
by the corresponding gravity equation for trade ows in the opposite direction, xji, to obtain
a bidirectional gravity equation that contains both countriesoutward and inward multilateral
resistance variables:
xijxji =

yiyj
yW
2
tijtji
iPijPj
1 
(6)
Substituting the solution from equation (5) yields
xijxji = xiixjj

tiitjj
tijtji
 1
(7)
The size variable in gravity equation (7) is not total income yiyj as in traditional gravity
equations but intranational trade xiixjj. Intranational trade does not only control for the
countrieseconomic size, but according to equation (5) it is also directly linked to multilateral
resistance. (7) can be rearranged as
tijtji
tiitjj
=

xiixjj
xijxji
 1
 1
As shipping costs between i and j can be asymmetric (tij 6= tji) and as domestic trade costs
can di¤er across countries (tii 6= tjj), it is useful to take the geometric mean of the barriers in
both directions. It is also useful to deduct one to get an expression for the tari¤ equivalent. I
denote the resulting trade cost measure as  ij:
 ij 

tijtji
tiitjj
 1
2
  1 =

xiixjj
xijxji
 1
2( 1)
  1 (8)
 ij measures bilateral trade costs tijtji relative to domestic trade costs tiitjj. It therefore does
not impose frictionless domestic trade and captures what makes international trade more costly
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over and above domestic trade.7
The intuition behind  ij is straightforward. If bilateral trade ows xijxji increase relative
to domestic trade ows xiixjj, it must have become easier for the two countries to trade with
each other. This is captured by a decrease in  ij, and vice versa. The measure thus captures
trade costs in an indirect way by inferring them from observable trade ows. Since these trade
ows vary over time, trade costs  ij can be computed not only for cross-sectional data but also
for time series and panel data. This is an advantage over the procedure adopted by Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) who only use cross-sectional data.
It is important to stress that bilateral barriers might be asymmetric (tij 6= tji) and that
bilateral trade ows might be unbalanced (xij 6= xji).  ij indicates the geometric average of
the bilateral trade barriers in both directions.
Finally, the model above and thus the trade cost measure  ij can also be motivated by
a Heckscher-Ohlin setting. Deardor¤ (1998) argues that whenever there are bilateral trade
barriers, the Heckscher-Ohlin model cannot have factor price equalization between two countries
that trade with each other. If factor prices were equalized, prices would also be equalized and
neither country could overcome the trade barriers. In a world with a large number of goods
and few factors it is therefore likely that one country will be the lowest-cost producer and that
trade in a Heckscher-Ohlin world resembles trade in an Armington world.
2.2 Trade Costs in a Ricardian Model
Whereas the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model is a demand-side model that takes
production as exogenous, the Ricardian model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) emphasizes the
supply side. Each country can potentially produce every single good on the global range of
goods but there will be only one lowest-cost producer who serves all other countries, provided
that the cross-country price di¤erential exceeds variable bilateral trade costs tij. Eaton and
Kortum (2002) thus introduce an extensive margin of trade.
Productivity in each country is drawn from a Fréchet distribution. The parameter Ti deter-
mines the average absolute productivity advantage of country i, with a high Ti denoting high
overall productivity. The parameter # > 1 governs the variation of the productivity distribu-
tion and is treated as common across countries, with a low # denoting much variation and thus
much scope for comparative advantage. The model yields a gravity-like equation for aggregate
trade ows. It is given by
xij =
Ti (citij)
 #PJ
i=1 Ti (citij)
 #yj (9)
where ci denotes the input cost in country i and yj is total expenditure of destination country
j.
Since ci and Ti are generally unknown, it is not possible to isolate the individual trade cost
parameter tij from equation (9) in terms of observable variables. However, following the same
7 ij can also be interpreted as a measure of the international component of trade costs net of distribution
trade costs in the destination country. Formally, suppose total gross shipping costs tij can be decomposed into
gross shipping costs up to the border of j, denoted by tij , times the gross shipping costs within j, denoted
by tjj , where tjj does not depend on the origin of shipment. It follows tij = tijtjj and tji = t

jitii so that
 ij =
p
tijt

ji   1.
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approach as in equation (8) I can relate the combination of bilateral and domestic trade cost
parameters to the ratio of domestic trade, xiixjj, over bilateral trade, xijxji. This yields
EKij =

tijtji
tiitjj
 1
2
  1 =

xiixjj
xijxji
 1
2#
  1 (10)
The trade cost measure EKij is thus isomorphic to  ij in equation (8) with # corresponding
to    1. The Ricardian model therefore implies virtually the same trade cost measure. Since
trade is driven by comparative advantage, the sensitivity of the implied trade costs EKij to
trade ows depends on the heterogeneity in countriesrelative productivities, determined by #.
But in Anderson and van Wincoops (2003) consumption-based model, where trade is driven by
love of variety, the sensitivity depends on the degree of production di¤erentiation, determined
by .8
2.3 Trade Costs in Heterogeneous Firms Models
Turning to an additional class of models, I consider the trade theories with heterogeneous rms
by Chaney (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Firms have di¤erent levels of productivity,
depending on their draws from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter .
Chaney (2008) builds on the seminal paper by Melitz (2003) where each rm produces
a unique product but faces bilateral xed costs of exporting, fij. He derives the following
aggregate gravity equation:
xij = 
yiyj
yW

witij
j
 
(fij)
 (  1 1) (11)
where  is the weight of di¤erentiated goods in the consumers utility function, wi is workers
productivity in country i and j is a remoteness variable akin to multilateral resistance.9 Once
again, I can relate the combination of bilateral and domestic trade cost parameters to the ratio
of domestic and bilateral trade ows to obtain
Chij =

tijtji
tiitjj
 1
2

fijfji
fiifjj
 1
2(
1
 1  1 )
  1 =

xiixjj
xijxji
 1
2
  1 (12)
The trade cost measure Chij captures both variable and xed trade costs. Its sensitivity to trade
ows depends on the productivity distribution parameter  that governs the entry and exit of
rms into export markets.10
8See Eaton and Kortum (2002, footnote 20) for more details on the similarities between the Ricardian model
and theories based on the Armington assumption.
9The gravity equation implicitly assumes that the economy can be modeled as having only one sector of
di¤erentiated products. This can easily be extended to multiple sectors.
10For the case of non-zero trade ows, the heterogeneous rms model by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein
(2008) is consistent with the same trade cost measure, that is, HMRij = 
Ch
ij . In their notation, non-zero trade
ows imply Vij > 0. Additional assumptions to obtain this result are: the existence of positive xed costs for
domestic sale, fii > 0, the possibility of positive domestic variable trade costs, tii  1, and, as in Appendix II
of their paper, no upper bound in the support of the productivity distribution, aL = 0.
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Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) use non-CES preferences that give rise to endogenous markups.
Heterogeneous rms face sunk costs of market entry fE that can be interpreted as product
development and production start-up costs. When exporting, the rms only face variable costs
and no xed costs of exporting. They yield the following gravity equation:
xij =
1
2( + 2)
NEi  iLj
 
cdj
+2
(tij)
  (13)
where  is a parameter from the utility function that indicates the degree of product di¤erenti-
ation. NEi is the number of entrants in country i.  i is an index of comparative advantage in
technology. Lj denotes the number of consumers in country j. cdj is the marginal cost cut-o¤
above which domestic rms in country j do not produce. As above, the only bilateral variable
in equation (13) is the trade cost factor tij. All other variables are country-specic and therefore
drop out when the ratio of domestic to bilateral trade ows is considered. Thus,
MOij =

tijtji
tiitjj
 1
2
  1 =

xiixjj
xijxji
 1
2
  1 (14)
The trade cost measure MOij is exactly the same function of observable trade ows as 
Ch
ij . The
di¤erence in interpretation is that xed costs do not enter MOij because rms only face variable
costs of exporting.
2.4 Summary
The four measures  ij, EKij , 
Ch
ij and 
MO
ij have in common that they scale the ratio of domestic
over bilateral trade ows by parameters that indicate a particular form of heterogeneity. A low
 in equation (8) indicates a high degree of di¤erentiation across products ; a low # in equation
(10) indicates a high variation of productivity; and a low  in equations (12) and (14) indicates
a high degree of rm heterogeneity.
All four measures imply that higher heterogeneity corresponds to higher trade frictions.11
The intuition is that higher heterogeneity provides a larger incentive to trade. If heterogeneity
is high but international trade ows are small, it must be the case that international integration
is impeded by large trade barriers.
3 U.S. Trade Costs
As an illustration of the trade cost measure  ij derived in the previous section, I compute U.S.
bilateral trade costs for a number of major trading partners. I focus on how these bilateral
trade costs have evolved over time using annual data for 1970-2000.
All bilateral aggregate trade data are taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
(DOTS) and denominated in U.S. dollars. Data for intranational trade xii are not directly
available but can be constructed following the approach by Shang-Jin Wei (1996). Due to
market clearing intranational trade can be expressed as total income minus total exports, xii =
11This is true if the ratio of domestic over bilateral trade is larger than one, which is generically the case in
the data.
9
1970 1980 1990 2000
0
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Ta
rif
f e
qu
iv
al
en
t t
U.S. - Canada
NAFTACUSFTA
1970 1980 1990 2000
0
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Ta
rif
f e
qu
iv
al
en
t t
U.S. - Mexico
NAFTA
Unilateral Mexican
trade liberalization
Figure 1: U.S. bilateral trade costs with Canada and Mexico.
yi   xi, where total exports xi are dened as the sum of all exports from country i, xi P
j 6=i xij.
12 However, GDP data are not suitable as income yi because they are based on value
added, whereas the trade data are reported as gross shipments. Moreover, GDP data include
services that are not covered by the trade data.13 To get the gross shipment counterpart of GDP
excluding services I follow Wei (1996) in constructing yi as total goods production based on
the OECDs Structural Analysis (STAN) database.14 The production data are converted into
U.S. dollars by the period average exchange rate taken from the IMF International Financial
Statistics (IFS).
Since the trade cost measure can be derived from various models (see equations 8, 10, 12 and
14), it potentially depends on di¤erent parameters, namely the elasticity of substitution , the
Fréchet parameter # and the Pareto parameter . Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) survey
estimates of  and conclude that it typically falls in the range of 5 to 10. Eaton and Kortum
(2002) report their baseline estimate for # as 8:3.15 Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004, Figure
3) estimate    (   1) to be around unity, which implies   . Chaney (2008) estimates
= (   1) as roughly equal to 2, which suggests a higher value for , but Del Gatto, Mion and
Ottaviano (2007) estimate magnitudes of  that are lower. Given these estimates I proceed by
following Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) in setting  = 8, which corresponds to #;  = 7.16
This can be seen as a ballpark parameter value suitable for aggregate trade ows. As I discuss
in Section 5, the overall results are not sensitive to this particular value.
Figure 1 illustrates U.S. bilateral trade costs with its two biggest trading partners, Canada
and Mexico. U.S. trade costs fell dramatically with Mexico (from 96 to 33 percent) and also with
12See equation (8) in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
13Anderson (1979) acknowledges nontradable services and models the spending on tradables as yi, where 
is the fraction of total income spent on tradables. But yi would still be based on value added.
14Wei (1996) uses production data for agriculture, mining and total manufacturing. Also see Nitsch (2000).
15This estimate is based on trade data and falls in the middle of the range of estimates based on other data.
They estimate # = 12:9 based on price data and # = 3:6 based on wage data.
16The exponent of the ratio of domestic to bilateral trade ows in equation (8) is 1=(2(   1)), which corre-
sponds to 1=(2#) and 1=(2) in equations (10), (12) and (14).
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Canada (from 50 to 25 percent). The U.S. experienced a clear downward trend in trade costs
with both its neighbors already prior to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA,
e¤ective from 1994), the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA, e¤ective from 1989)
and unilateral Mexican trade liberalization (from 1985).17
It is important to stress that these numbers represent bilateral relative to domestic trade
costs. For example, take the result that U.S.-Canadian trade costs are 25 percent in the year
2000. Suppose that a particular good produced in either the U.S. or Canada costs $10.00 at the
factory gate and abstract from possible xed costs of exporting.18 Also suppose that domestic
wholesale and retail distribution costs are 55 percent (tii=1.55), which is the representative
domestic distribution cost across OECD countries as reported by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2004). A domestic consumer could therefore buy the product for $15.50, whereas a consumer
abroad would have to pay $19.40 (tij=1.94=1.551.25). This example illustrates that the ab-
solute domestic trade costs ($5.50=$15.50-$10.00) can be substantially bigger than the absolute
cost of crossing the border ($3.90=$19.40-$15.50). Of course, this particular example is based
on an aggregate average and should be interpreted as such. In practice, trade costs can vary
considerably across goods. For instance, perishable goods are more likely to be transported by
air freight instead of less expensive truck or ocean shipping.
Table 1 reports the levels and the percentage decline in U.S. bilateral trade costs between
1970 and 2000 with its six biggest export markets as of 2000. In descending order these are
Canada, Mexico, Japan, the UK, Germany and Korea.19 The decline has been most dramatic
with Mexico and Canada and has been sizeable with Korea, the UK, Germany and Japan.
The trade-weighted average of U.S. trade costs declined by 44 percent between 1970 and 2000,
corresponding to an annualized decline of 1:9 percent per year.20 Its 2000 level stands at 42
percent.
The magnitudes of the bilateral trade costs in Table 1 are entirely consistent with cross-
sectional evidence from the literature. For the year 1993 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
report a 46 percent tari¤equivalent of overall U.S.-Canadian trade costs, compared to 31 percent
in Figure 1.21 The reason why the number reported by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) is
somewhat higher is that they use GDP data as opposed to production data to compute trade
costs. In fact, when using GDP data I obtain U.S.-Canadian trade costs of 47 percent for 1993,
almost exactly the 46 percent value reported by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).22 But
GDP data tend to overstate the extent of intranational trade and thus the level of trade costs
17As pointed out earlier,  ij is related to the freeness of trademeasure in the New Economic Geography
literature, see Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). For a plot of the inverse freeness measure in a two-country
model, see Figure 2 in Head and Ries (2001).
18In equation (12) this would mean fij = f 8 i; j so that the xed costs drop out of the expression for Chij .
19These six countries are those for which the 2000 share of U.S. exports exceeded 3 percent. Between 1970
and 2000 their combined share of U.S. exports uctuated between 43 and 58 percent.
20x =  0:019 is the solution to 42 = 74(1 + x)30.
21Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) calculate the tari¤ equivalent as the trade-weighted average barrier for
trade between U.S. states and Canadian provinces relative to the trade-weighted average barrier for trade within
the United States and Canada, using a trade cost function that includes a border-related dummy variable and
distance.
22For  = 5 and  = 10 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, Table 7) report 1993 U.S.-Canadian trade cost
tari¤ equivalents of 91 and 35 percent, respectively. The corresponding numbers based on (8) are 97 and 35
percent when using GDP data and 61 and 24 percent when using production data.
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Table 1: U.S. Bilateral Trade Costs
Tari¤ equivalent  in %
Partner country 1970 2000 Percentage change
canada 50 25  50
germany 95 70  26
japan 85 65  24
korea 107 70  35
mexico 96 33  66
uk 95 63  34
Plain average 88 54  38
Trade-weighted average 74 42  44
All numbers are in percent and rounded o¤ to integers.
Countries listed are the six biggest U.S. export markets as of 2000.
Computations based on equation (8).
because they include services.23 I therefore prefer to follow Wei (1996) in using merchandise
production data to match the trade data more accurately. Eaton and Kortum (2002) report
bilateral tari¤ equivalents based on data for 19 OECD countries in 1990. For countries that are
750-1500 miles apart, an elasticity of substitution of  = 8 implies a trade cost range of 58-78
percent, consistent with the magnitudes in Table 1.
It is important to point out that the trade cost measure  ij captures not only trade costs
in the narrow sense of transportation costs and tari¤s but also trade cost components such
as language barriers and currency barriers. In their survey of trade costs, Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004) show that such non-tari¤ barriers are substantial. They suggest that U.S.
transport costs on their own constitute a tari¤ equivalent of only 10:7 percent on average,
a value which is substantially lower than the numbers in Table 1. Likewise, world average
c.i.f./f.o.b. ratios reported by the IMF only stand around 3 percent for the year 2000. Kee,
Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) compute trade restrictiveness indices that are based on tari¤s
and non-tari¤ barriers such as import quotas, subsidies and antidumping duties. The tari¤
equivalent of the U.S. trade restrictiveness index is 29 percent, which is also slightly below the
U.S. average in Table 1.
In summary, the trade cost measure  ij can be constructed for individual country pairs with
minimal data requirements. Its main advantage over previous trade cost measures is that it
can be easily tracked over time since it does not depend on time-invariant trade cost proxies
such as geographical distance. Figure 1 and Table 1 demonstrate that inferred trade costs are
large but generally experienced a substantial decline between 1970 and 2000. They exhibit
considerable heterogeneity across country pairs that would be masked by a one-ts-all measure
of trade costs.24
23Specically, intranational trade is given by xii = yi   xi. As GDP data include services and as the service
share of GDP has continually grown, the use of GDP data for yi overstates xii compared to the use of production
data despite the fact that imported intermediate goods are included in the trade data (see Helliwell, 2005). Novy
(2007) develops a trade cost model with nontradable goods, showing that only the tradable part of output enters
the models micro-founded gravity equation.
24For a comparison of the period 1950-2000 to the period 1870-1913 see Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2008).
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4 Decomposing the Growth of Trade
Bilateral trade has grown strongly between most countries in recent decades. It is an important
question whether this increase in trade is simply the result of secular economic growth or
whether the increase can be related to reductions in trade frictions. The gravity equation
together with the trade cost measure  ij provide a simple analytical framework to address this
question. I will use the gravity model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for the exposition,
but I refer to the Technical Appendix where I show that the growth of trade can be similarly
decomposed by using the other gravity equations described in Section 2.
As the rst step I take the natural logarithm and then the rst di¤erence of equation (6).
This yields
 ln (xijxji) = 2 ln

yiyj
yW

+ (1  ) ln (tijtji)  (1  ) ln (iPijPj) (15)
Equation (15) relates the growth of bilateral trade,  ln (xijxji), to three driving forces: the
growth of the two countrieseconomies relative to world output, changes in bilateral trade costs,
 ln (tijtji), and changes in the two countriesmultilateral trade barriers,  ln (iPijPj). The
bilateral trade cost factors tijtji are unknown. But we know from equation (8) that the trade
cost measure  ij provides an expression for tijtji relative to domestic trade costs tiitjj as a
function of observable trade ows. I therefore substitute  ij into equation (15) to obtain
 ln (xijxji) = 2 ln

yiyj
yW

+ 2 (1  ) ln (1 +  ij)  2 (1  ) ln (ij)
where i is shorthand for country is multilateral resistance relative to domestic trade costs,
i =

iPi
tii
 1
2
Finally, I divide by the left-hand side to arrive at the following bilateral decomposition equation:
100% =
2 ln

yiyj
yW

 ln (xijxji)| {z }
(a)
+
2 (1  ) ln (1 +  ij)
 ln (xijxji)| {z }
(b)
  2 (1  ) ln (ij)
 ln (xijxji)| {z }
(c)
(16)
Equation (16) decomposes the growth of bilateral trade into three contributions: (a) the
contribution of income growth, (b) the contribution of the decline in bilateral trade costs,
and (c) the contribution of the decline in multilateral resistance.25 For example, if all bi-
lateral trade barriers were constant over time, then contribution (b) would be zero and the
25Baier and Bergstrand (2001) further decompose the product of incomes, yiyj , into income shares and the
sum of incomes. Dene the bilateral income share as si = yi=(yi + yj). It follows yiyj = sisj(yi + yj)2 and thus
 ln (yiyj) =  ln (sisj) + 2 ln (yi + yj).  ln (sisj) could then be interpreted as the contribution of income
convergence. Also see Helpman (1987), Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) and Debaere (2005). However, after
controlling for tari¤ cuts and transport cost reductions Baier and Bergstrand (2001) nd virtually no e¤ect of
income convergence on trade growth.
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growth of trade would be driven by the growth of income. But if bilateral trade costs fall (i.e.,
 ln (1 +  ij) < 0), then contribution (b) becomes positive.26 If multilateral trade barriers fall
(i.e.,  ln (ij) < 0), then contribution (c) becomes negative. This negative contribution can
be interpreted as a trade diversion e¤ect. If trade barriers with other countries fall, trade with
those countries increases but bilateral trade between i and j decreases.
To be clear about the approach, I do not estimate equation (16). Instead, I decompose
the growth of bilateral trade conditional on the theoretical gravity framework. Contribution
(a) is given by the data. Contribution (b) is also given by the data through equation (8).
Likewise, contribution (c) is given by the solution for multilateral resistance in equation (5).27
The purpose is to uncover whether trade growth is mainly associated with income growth,
declining bilateral trade barriers or changes in multilateral barriers.
As I show in the Technical Appendix, decomposition equations very similar to equation
(16) can be derived from the models by Eaton and Kortum (2002), Chaney (2008) and Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008). The quantitative contributions of income growth (a), declining bilateral
trade costs (b) and multilateral factors (c) turn out exactly the same. But the interpretation of
components (b) and (c) slightly di¤ers from model to model. For example, in the heterogeneous
rms model by Chaney (2008) components (b) and (c) capture not only variable trade costs
but also xed trade costs.
4.1 Decomposing the Growth of U.S. Trade
I apply equation (16) to decompose the growth of U.S. bilateral trade. As in Table 1, I consider
the six biggest U.S. export markets as of 2000. Table 2 reports the decomposition results.
Table 2 shows that for the period 1970 to 2000 the growth of income can explain more than
half of the growth of U.S. bilateral trade. Income growth can explain almost all of the trade
growth with Korea (92:3 percent) but only just over 50 percent with Mexico and the UK. The
decline of bilateral trade costs on average provides the second most important contribution
to the growth of bilateral trade. This contribution is biggest for Mexico (57:4 percent) and
smallest for Japan (28:3 percent).
The decline of multilateral trade barriers diverts trade away from the U.S. Take the example
of Korea. Korean trade barriers with other countries dropped considerably over time so that
the diversion e¤ect is relatively strong for Korea ( 25:8 percent). The decline in multilateral
resistance partially o¤sets the e¤ect of declining bilateral trade costs so that the overall role of
trade costs (33:5  25:8 = 7:7 percent) is modest compared to other countries in the sample.
The multilateral resistance e¤ect is actually slightly positive for the UK (+0:3 percent). This
means that on average multilateral trade barriers for the UK increased over time, making trade
with the U.S. relatively more attractive. This result is particular to the UK as a major former
colonial power since the UKs traditionally strong trade relationships with former colonies such
26Recall  > 1. To be precise, a fall in bilateral trade costs also leads to a slight fall in ij because
multilateral resistance is a weighted average of all bilateral trade costs, see equations (2) and (3). Since the
fall in ij works against the e¤ect of falling bilateral trade costs, contribution (b) in principle overstates their
e¤ect but in practice the overstatement is negligible.
27Equation (8) implies 2 (1  ) ln (1 +  ij) =  ln (xijxji)    ln (xiixjj). Equation (5) implies
2 (1  ) ln (ij) =  ln

yi=y
W
xii=yi

+  ln

yj=y
W
xjj=yj

. Note that the decomposition does not depend on the
value of the elasticity of substitution  even if it changes over time.
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Table 2: Decomposing the Growth of U.S. Bilateral Trade
Partner
country
Growth
in trade
Contribution of
the growth in
income
Contribution of
the decline in
bilateral trade costs
Contribution of
the decline in
multilateral resistance
Total
canada 609 65:3 + 42:3   7:6 = 100
germany 526 67:1 + 36:4   3:5 = 100
japan 580 79:3 + 28:3   7:6 = 100
korea 832 92:3 + 33:5   25:8 = 100
mexico 944 54:8 + 57:4   12:2 = 100
uk 578 55:9 + 43:8 + 0:3 = 100
Growth between 1970 and 2000. All numbers in percent.
Countries listed are the six biggest U.S. export markets as of 2000.
Computations based on equation (16). Also see the Technical Appendix.
as Australia and New Zealand became weaker over time.28
In summary, Table 2 demonstrates that income growth is the biggest driving force behind
the increase in bilateral U.S. trade. This result is consistent with the ndings of Baier and
Bergstrand (2001) who argue that two-thirds of the growth in trade amongst OECD countries
between 1958 and 1988 can be explained by the growth of income.29 But the innovation of
decomposing the growth of trade with equation (16) is to explicitly take multilateral trade
barriers into account. They are important because in general equilibrium, the trade ows
between any two countries are a¤ected both by bilateral and multilateral trade barriers.30
5 Discussion
A comprehensive trade cost measure The trade cost measure in equation (8) is compre-
hensive since it captures a wide range of trade cost components such as transportation costs and
tari¤s, but also components that are not directly observable such as the costs associated with
language barriers and red tape. It should therefore be regarded as an upper bound that cap-
tures all trade cost elements that make international trade more costly over and above domestic
trade. Instead, direct measures of specic trade cost components can be seen as a lower bound
of trade costs, for example international transportation costs reported by Hummels (2007). As
discussed in Section 3, U.S. transport costs correspond to a tari¤ equivalent of around 10 per-
cent on average, which is roughly a quarter of the average trade cost measure for the U.S. in
2000 in Table 1. Average c.i.f./f.o.b. ratios are typically even lower. The trade restrictiveness
indices by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009), which capture both tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers,
28Novy (2007) shows that the trade-enhancing e¤ect of a former colonial relationship was strong in 1970 but
gradually tapered o¤ thereafter, becoming insignicant by the year 2000. Also see Head, Mayer and Ries (2008).
29Whalley and Xin (2009) calibrate a general equilibrium model of world trade. For a sample of both OECD
and non-OECD countries they nd that income growth explains 76 percent of the growth of international trade
between 1975 and 2004. This nding suggests that trade barrier reductions might have been less important for
explaining the trade growth of non-OECD countries.
30Another di¤erence is that Baier and Bergstrand (2001) only consider tari¤s and transportation costs,
whereas trade costs here are more broadly dened to include informational, institutional and nontari¤ bar-
riers to trade.
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Figure 2: U.S. bilateral trade costs with 99 percent condence intervals.
stand at 29 percent for the U.S., slightly lower than the average in Table 1.
Measurement error The trade cost measure  ij is computed based on equation (8) by
plugging in the trade data for xijxji and xiixjj. Thus, trade costs are inferred without allowing
for any stochastic elements. One potential concern with this approach is that the trade data
might be subject to measurement error. In particular, suppose that the observed trade ow
xij is a function of the true trade ow xij and an additive measurement error uij such that
ln(xij) = ln(x

ij) + uij. This measurement error might contaminate the trade cost measure.
To address this concern I divide gravity equation (7) by domestic trade ows xiixjj and
estimate the following loglinear regression:
ln

xijxji
xiixjj

=  ln

tiitjj
tijtji

+ t + "ij (17)
where t are annual time dummies and "ij is a composite error term given by "ij = uij + uji  
uii   ujj. Since the trade cost parameters are unobservable, I instead substitute country pair
xed e¤ects ij. The country pair xed e¤ects are allowed to vary over time to reect changes
in trade costs. As annual xed e¤ects would leave no degrees of freedom, I choose biennial
country pair xed e¤ects instead. The sample includes the U.S. as well as the countries listed
in Table 1 from 1970-2000.31 The regression yields a very high R2 (=0.996) with the large
majority of xed e¤ects tightly estimated (p-value < 0.01).
As the nal step, I generate predicted values of the dependent variable from the estimated
coe¢ cients, and I use the predicted values to construct a predicted trade cost measure b ij based
on equation (8). b ij is supposed to strip out measurement error by construction since it does
not include the regression residual that corresponds to "ij. Figure 2 plots the rawtrade cost
31There are 651 observations (21 country pairs times 31 years). Standard errors are robust and clustered
around country pairs. The last subperiod comprises three instead of two years (1998-2000). Other subperiod
lengths, say, quinquennial or decadal, would be possible but would not a¤ect the results qualitatively.
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measure  ij as in Figure 1 (solid lines) as well as the 99 percent condence intervals (dotted
lines) that correspond to the predicted measure b ij.32 The intervals are somewhat wider for
the 1970s and early 1980s, which suggests lower data quality in that period. Overall, the raw
trade cost measure tends to fall within the condence intervals and it therefore seems unlikely
that  ij is signicantly distorted by measurement error.
As an additional check, I rerun regression (17), replacing the country pair xed e¤ects by
standard trade cost proxies. I use the log of bilateral distance, an adjacency dummy, a common
language dummy, a joint colonial history dummy as well as country xed e¤ects to capture the
domestic trade cost parameters tii and tjj.33 A major problem with this specication is that the
explanatory variables are time-invariant and thus not able to capture trade cost changes over
time.34 Instead, the setup imposes a common time trend governed by the annual time dummies
t. As a result, the predicted trade cost measure fails to pick up pair-specic time trends.
For example, it fails to match the relatively strong decline in U.S.-Mexican trade costs during
the 1990s that coincides with the establishment of NAFTA. This mismatch could potentially
be remedied by time-varying and country-pair specic explanatory variables such as bilateral
freight rates but unfortunately, such data are di¢ cult to obtain for a panel.
Income elasticities The trade cost measure is derived from gravity equations that have
a unit income elasticity.35 Although this is a standard feature of gravity models, empirical
researchers sometimes estimate income elasticities that deviate from unity, for example Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
Despite the lack of a clear theoretical foundation, suppose the income elasticity in gravity
equations (1), (9) and (11) is  6= 1 with  > 0. It is easy to show that the trade cost measure
 ij is una¤ected. The contribution of declining bilateral trade costs in decomposition equation
(16) therefore also remains the same. But the contribution of income growth would increase
if  > 1 and decrease if  < 1, and the contribution of declining multilateral resistance would
change in the opposite direction by exactly the same extent.
Sensitivity to parameter values The trade cost measure can be derived from di¤erent un-
derlying models and therefore potentially depends on di¤erent parameters, namely the elasticity
of substitution , the Fréchet parameter # and the Pareto parameter . Although estimates
of these parameters usually fall within certain ranges, there is probably no consensus in the
literature as to their precise values (see the discussion in Section 3). It turns out that the levels
of the trade cost measure  ij are quite sensitive to the chosen parameter values.36 The changes
of the trade cost measure over time, however, are hardly a¤ected. In fact, as pointed out in
Section 4 and the Technical Appendix, the decomposition of the growth of trade in Table 2 is
not a¤ected by parameter values at all.
32The condence intervals are calculated with the delta method. To keep the graph clear, the predicted
measure b ij is not plotted. It would be located in the middle of the intervals.
33As in standard gravity regressions, these trade cost proxies are highly signicant. The R2 is 0.88.
34Another potential problem is specication error. The functional form of the implied trade cost function is
arbitrary. For a discussion see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, Section 3.3).
35In the case of gravity equation (13) there is a unit elasticity with respect to the number of entering rms in
the origin country and the number of consumers in the destination country.
36This is true more generally. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) show that levels of trade cost
estimates are typically sensitive to the value of .
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As    1 corresponds to # and , I will focus the discussion on one single parameter, .16
The trade cost levels reported in Table 1 and Figure 1 are based on  = 8, which is in the
middle of the common empirical range of 5 to 10 for the elasticity of substitution, as surveyed
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). For  = 8 the trade-weighted average of U.S. bilateral
trade costs in Table 1 falls from 74 to 42 percent, a decline of 44 percent. In the case of  = 10
the trade-weighted average would fall from 54 to 31 percent, a similar decline of 42 percent. In
the case of  = 5 the trade-weighted average would fall from 167 to 87 percent, a decline of 48
percent. Thus, although the levels are sensitive to the parameter value, the change of the trade
cost measure over time is robust.
A higher value of  in equation (8) implies lower inferred trade costs levels. Intuitively, a
higher elasticity of substitution means that goods are less di¤erentiated and consumers are more
price-sensitive. The more price-sensitive consumers are, the fewer foreign goods they would buy
for a given di¤erence between bilateral and domestic trade costs. In order to match the given
empirical trade ows, a higher elasticity of substitution implies that the di¤erence between
bilateral and domestic trade costs must be relatively small, that is,  ij must be relatively low.
Likewise, a higher value of # in equation (10) implies lower inferred trade costs. Here the
intuition is that a higher # corresponds to less scope for Ricardian comparative advantage.
Thus, consumers have a smaller incentive to trade and implied trade costs must be lower to
match the empirical trade ows. A higher value of  in equations (12) and (14) also implies
lower trade costs. A higher  corresponds to less heterogeneity across rms, which all else being
equal would translate into fewer trade ows unless trade costs were lower.
Finally, it might be the case that the elasticity of substitution has changed over time. Fol-
lowing the approach of Feenstra (1994), Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate elasticities of
substitution based on demand and supply relationships for disaggregated U.S. imports. When
comparing the period 1972-1988 with 1990-2001, they nd that the median elasticity fell mar-
ginally. But the di¤erence is not signicant for all levels of disaggregation and it is unclear
whether there has been a signicant change in the elasticity at the aggregate level. If it were
the case that the aggregate elasticity fell over time, this would suggest that trade costs have
declined less quickly than indicated in Table 1. But quantitatively, this e¤ect would probably
not be large.37
Home bias in preferences It is conceivable that consumers predominantly consume domes-
tic goods not because of trade barriers that impede the import of foreign goods but simply
because of an inherent home bias in preferences. It is straightforward to incorporate a home
bias in preferences into the models outlined in Section 3. Their e¤ect would be observationally
equivalent to lower domestic trade barriers.38 Since the trade cost measure  ij captures bilat-
eral relative to domestic trade barriers, a home bias in preferences would correspond to inferred
trade cost levels that are higher than the trueunderlying levels. Home bias would thus lead
to an overestimate of levels. The change of inferred trade costs over time, however, does not
depend on home bias. This reinforces the view that changes in the trade cost measure tend to
be more instructive than its levels.
37According to Broda and Weinstein (2006, Table IV) the median elasticity fell from 3:7 to 3:1 at the 7-digit
level, from 2:8 to 2:7 at the 5-digit level and from 2:5 to 2:2 at the 3-digit level.
38That is, lower tii or fii.
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6 Conclusion
This paper develops a measure of international trade costs that varies across country pairs and
over time. The measure is micro-founded and infers bilateral trade costs indirectly from trade
data based on a workhorse model of international trade the gravity equation. I show that
the measure can be derived from a range of leading trade theories, including the Ricardian
model by Eaton and Kortum (2002), the gravity framework by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) as well as the heterogeneous rms models by Chaney (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008). The trade cost measure is a function of observable trade data and can therefore be
implemented easily with time series and panel data to track the changes of trade costs over
time. This approach obviates the need to impose specic trade cost functions that rely on trade
cost proxies such as distance.
In an empirical application I compute U.S. bilateral trade costs for a number of major
trading partners. I nd that trade costs on average declined by about 40 percent between 1970
and 2000. The decline of U.S. trade costs has been particularly strong with its neighbors Mexico
and Canada. I also examine the reasons behind the strong growth of U.S. bilateral trade over
that period. I nd that income growth is the single most important driving factor. Declines in
bilateral trade costs are in second place but quantitatively also play a substantial role.
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Technical Appendix: Decomposing the Growth of Trade
This appendix derives decomposition equations based on the models by Eaton and Kortum
(2002), Chaney (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). These decomposition equations cor-
respond to equation (16), which is based on the model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
The main result is that the decomposition results in Table 2 are consistent with all these models.
Decomposition Based on Eaton and Kortum (2002)
Eaton and Kortum (2002) rewrite gravity equation (9) as
xij = yiyj

tij
Pj
 #
PJ
j=1

tij
Pj
 #
yj
where Pj is the CES price index in country j and yi are total sales of exporter i dened as
yi 
PJ
j=1 xij. Multiplying and dividing the right-hand side by world income y
W yields
xij =
yiyj
yW

tij
EKi Pj
 #
(18)
where
 
EKi
 # PJj=1 P #j jt #ij has the same structure as the outward multilateral resistance
variable i in equation (2), with  1 replaced by #. Gravity equation (18) and gravity equation
(1) are thus isomorphic and the decomposition equation can be derived as outlined in Section
4. It follows as
100% =
2 ln

yiyj
yW

 ln (xijxji)| {z }
(a)
+
 2# ln  1 + EKij 
 ln (xijxji)| {z }
(b)
   2# ln
 
EKi 
EK
j

 ln (xijxji)| {z }
(c)
(19)
where
EKi =

EKi Pi
tii
 1
2
Note that the decomposition in equation (19) does not depend on the value of # even if # changes
over time. Contribution (a) is given by the data. Contribution (b) is also given by the data
through equation (10), i.e.,  2# ln  1 + EKij  =  ln (xijxji)  ln (xiixjj). Contribution (c)
is the multilateral residual. The quantitative results are therefore the same as in Table 2.
Decomposition Based on Chaney (2008)
Gravity equation (11) implies that the product of bilateral trade ows is given by
xijxji =


yiyj
yW
2
wiwjtijtji
ij
 
(fijfji)
 (  1 1)
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Taking the natural logarithm and the rst di¤erence leads to
 ln (xijxji) = 2 ln

yiyj
yW

  2 ln  1 + Chij + 2 ln  Chi Chj 
where Chij is substituted from equation (12) and where
Chi =
 

1
 i
witii (fii)
1
 1  1
! 1
2
Chi captures multilateral resistance i relative to variable and xed domestic trade costs, as
well as domestic productivity wi and the preference weight  consumers put on the di¤erentiated
goods sector. The decomposition equation follows as
100% =
2 ln

yiyj
yW

 ln (xijxji)| {z }
(a)
+
 2 ln  1 + Chij 
 ln (xijxji)| {z }
(b)
   2 ln
 
Chi 
Ch
j

 ln (xijxji)| {z }
(c)
(20)
Note that the decomposition in equation (20) does not depend on the value of  even if 
changes over time. Contribution (a) is given by the data. Contribution (b) is also given by the
data through equation (12), i.e.,  2 ln  1 + Chij  =  ln (xijxji)  ln (xiixjj). Contribution
(c) is the multilateral residual whose precise interpretation rests on the elements captured by
Chi . The quantitative results are therefore the same as in Table 2.
Decomposition Based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
Gravity equation (13) can be rewritten as
xij =
yiyj
yW
(tij)
  1
2( + 2)
NEi
yi=yW
 i
Lj
yj
 
cdj
+2
so that the product of bilateral trade ows can be expressed as
xijxji =

yiyj
yW
2
(tijtji)
 

1
2( + 2)
2
NEi
yi=yW
NEj
yj=yW
 i j
Li
yi
Lj
yj
 
cdi c
d
j
+2
Taking the natural logarithm and the rst di¤erence leads to
 ln (xijxji) = 2 ln

yiyj
yW

  2 ln  1 + MOij + 2 ln  MOi MOj 
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where MOij is substituted from equation (14) and where
MOi =
0B@

NEi
yi=yW
 i
Li
yi
 
cdi
+2 1
(2( + 2))
1
 tii
1CA
1
2
MOi reects domestic trade costs tii, the number of entrants N
E
i in country i relative to its
size in the global economy (yi=yW ), the extent of comparative advantage  i, per-capita income
Li=yi and the marginal cost cut-o¤ cdi above which domestic rms do not produce. Note that
both NEi and c
d
i depend on the bilateral trade costs between all other countries in the world
(see equations A.1 and A.2 in Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) so that they have a multilateral
interpretation.
The decomposition equation follows as
100% =
2 ln

yiyj
yW

 ln (xijxji)| {z }
(a)
+
 2 ln  1 + MOij 
 ln (xijxji)| {z }
(b)
   2 ln
 
MOi 
MO
j

 ln (xijxji)| {z }
(c)
(21)
Note that the decomposition in equation (21) does not depend on the value of  even if  changes
over time. Contribution (a) is given by the data. Contribution (b) is also given by the data
through equation (14), i.e.,  2 ln  1 + MOij  =  ln (xijxji)  ln (xiixjj). Contribution (c)
is the multilateral residual whose precise interpretation rests on the elements captured by MOi .
The quantitative results are therefore the same as in Table 2.
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